Building Fiscal Capacity with Traditional Political Institutions: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Sierra Leone

Abstract

How can weak states build fiscal capacity? I argue that governments in weak states can build fiscal capacity by collaborating with non-state, traditional political institutions (TPIs). To study the impact of collaboration, I partnered with the local government in Kono District, Sierra Leone (the KDC), and embedded an experiment within their awareness campaign for a new rural property tax. Property owners in 118 villages were shown videos with varying content. Those in the treatment group viewed an additional segment where their paramount chief discussed the collaboration between the chiefdom government and the KDC in the tax effort. Priming collaboration significantly increased tax compliance and strengthened property owners’ belief in their obligation to pay taxes. To assess mechanisms, I developed additional video segments where paramount chiefs emphasized either their coercive capacity or their accountability to constituents. The experimental findings, reinforced by qualitative evidence from 300 interviews, demonstrate that both coercion and accountability are crucial sources of TPIs’ authority.